未分类 – 第2页 – 硅发布 – 帮您观察真正的硅谷

备受激励^-^。在发布我已推出英文博客消息的当晚，就有超过 100 位读者订阅了我的英文博客，横跨美国的 7 个州和全球 14 个国家。

Incentives. On the night I launched my English blog message, more than 100 readers subscribed to my English blog, spanning 7 states across the United States and 14 countries around the globe.

美国读者主要集中在加州、纽约和华盛顿。

Readers in the United States are concentrated in California, New York and Washington.

所在国家排名前几位的是：美国、中国（包括中国香港）、新加坡，和日本。

The top rankings were the United States, China (including Hong Kong, China), Singapore and Japan.

谢谢大家。遵守和大家的约定，我昨晚已经发出了第一篇英文博客。需要 Gmail 订阅的朋友特别注意：Substack 的订阅邮件有可能被放到 Spam 里？

Thank you. Keep your promise, I sent my first English blog last night. Friends who need Gmail subscriptions pay particular attention: Substack's subscriptions are likely to be placed in Spam?

因为面对英文市场，我的英文博客内容会和硅发布不同，欢迎后台还没有订阅的全球读者订阅我的英文博客。地址是：

Since my English blog content is different from Silicon in the face of the English market, I would like to welcome a global reader from backstage who has not already subscribed to my English blog. The address is:

https://lynnyang.substack.com/

我做媒体，我关注创投圈，所以当 Insider 爆料“A16z 的科技网站 Future 已经死在了水里”时，我觉得有责任来多说几句——这涉及了投资机构最关注的一个问题：VC，究竟要不要做媒体？

I'm in the media, and I'm in the middle of it, so when Insider says, "A16z's technology website Future is dead in the water," I feel it's my duty to say a few more words -- which is one of the most important concerns of investment agencies: VC, do you want to be in the media?

Insider 指出：“可耻的失败，凸显了从无到有建立一个新媒体品牌的挑战”；以及，引用了部分记者的冷笑：“Future 的文章里，甚至都没有最合理的质疑。”

According to Insider: “The shameful failure highlights the challenge of creating a new media brand from scratch”; and, quotes the cynicism of some journalists: “The Fukure article does not even have the most reasonable doubt.”

然而 Insider 首先就搞错了一个基本事实：A16z 从来就没有想过要做一个媒体。

However, Insider made a basic mistake in the first place: A16z never wanted to be a media.

很显然，造成 Future 死亡的真正原因是创投圈残酷的生命周期。

Obviously, the real cause of Future's death is the vicious life cycle of the impending circle.

A16z 关闭 Future，就像现在任何一个美国 VC 在其投资组合公司耳边吹的冷风一样：

A16z closes Future, as any American VC now plays in the ears of its portfolio:

当市场上钱很多时，做任何试图扩张的事都是对的。但当市场上出现流动性紧张甚至这种紧张遥遥无期时，公司裁员、业务线收缩——突然之间，领导者们意识到，需要重新评估自己投入一件事情的“性价比”了。

When there is money in the market, it is right to do anything that seeks to expand. But when there are liquidity constraints in the market, even these tensions, the company cuts and business lines shrink — suddenly, leaders realize that they need to re-evaluate the “value for money” of something they put into it.

（一）

“Future 的文章里，甚至都没有最合理的质疑。”?

"Future's article doesn't even have the most reasonable doubt?"

Insider 引用的这句话，凸显了传统记者与创投圈冲突不断的根本原因——在美国，这两个群体都号称要改变世界，但这两者改变世界的方式是非常不一样的。

The quote quoted by Insider highlights the underlying causes of the ongoing conflict between traditional journalists and creative circles — in the United States, both groups claim to change the world, but the ways in which they change the world are very different.

其中，创投圈的核心价值观一直是“做梦”。

Among them, the core values of creative circles have always been “dreaming”.

这就是为什么红杉资本合伙人、亿万富翁 Doug Leone 在爆出 FTX丑闻时会这样向外界道歉道：

That's why the Redwood Capital Partner, Doug Leone, apologized to the outside world when the FTX scandal broke out:

“短期内，红杉资本可能会因此改变投资原则，接下来的 3-6 个月里，我们会少做梦。”但随后，他马上又补充道：

“In the short term, Redwood capital may change the principles of investment, and in the next three to six months we will have fewer dreams.” He then added:

“（但）就像生孩子，你会在三个月后一年后忘记生孩子的痛苦。我们希望从事梦想中的事业。我们不想失去与你保持一致、并与你一起梦想的真正信念——如果失去它，我认为我们就倒闭了。”

“But like having a child, you will forget the pain of having a child in three months' time. We want to do what we dream of. We don't want to lose the true faith that we want to be with you and with you — and if we lose it, I think we're going to fail.”

Doug Leone 的话是真实的。

Doug Leone's words are true.

风险投资的核心，一直是专注于技术如何改变人类。这就决定了：整个风险投资模式，本质上是在为“失败”提供资金，直到找到了“成功”为止。

At the heart of venture capital has been a focus on how technology can change humanity. That determines that the whole venture model is essentially financing “failure” until it is “successful”.

在大众看来，这可能是一种无知或者天真，但最好的投资者和创始人，都是这种最纯粹的“乐观现实主义者”。

In the eyes of the public, this may be an ignorance or naiveness, but the best investors and founders are the purest “optimists”.

而不幸的是，也正是这一点，解释了为什么几乎每隔几年，创投圈就会出现大规模的欺诈案。甚至很多早期项目的投资者，个人都有过被欺诈的经历。

Unfortunately, that is why, almost every few years, there are large-scale frauds in creative circles. Even many early project investors have personal experiences of fraud.

从文化上讲，VC 的文化，更加倾向于基于创始人或是某个大市场来做投资，而不是基于深入的尽职调查——这也和传统记者的经历或者说最高荣誉，截然相反。

Culturally, VC culture tends to be based on investment by its founders or by a major market, rather than on in-depth due diligence — which is also the opposite of traditional journalistic experience or the highest honour.

总而言之，创投圈是一个很小众的群体。其阅读品味，也很小众。

In short, it's a very small group. It's also a very small reading class.

A16z?当然不会?Low?到天天在Future里说自己的投资组合公司有多好。事实上，Future 是一个聚合了很多前沿人士观点与见解的地方思考。Future 似乎想要建立起一个吸引前沿观点碰撞的科技乐观主义乐园——想一想，创业者都喜欢看科幻小说——就像当年凯文.凯利给《连线》写的发刊词一样：“成为一个反向的时间飞船。”但显然，随着科技股在二级市场上的连连溃败，击破了这种集体做梦的氛围。

A16z? No? Low? Every day in Future says how good it is to be a portfolio company. In fact, Future is a place to think, bringing together the views and opinions of many of the frontlines. Future seems to want to build a climate of technological optimism that attracts frontier views -- and, think about it, entrepreneurs like to read science fiction -- like Kevin Kelly wrote to Wire that year: “Being a reverse timeship.” Obviously, as the technology unit collapses in second-tier markets, it breaks this collective dream atmosphere.

下面这两张图，清晰地表明了?Future 的读者阅读曲线变化，与整个纳斯达克指数的波动曲线，惊人地吻合。

The following two graphs clearly illustrate the changes in the reader reading curves of Future, which are strikingly consistent with the fluctuation curve of the NASDAQ index as a whole.

Future 创建于科技乐观主义的最顶峰——2021 年 6 月。之后，访问量在今年秋天逐渐减弱，直到 10 月 Future 停更。

Founded at the peak of techno-optimism in June 2021. After this fall, the number of visits declined until the end of October.

尽管今年开初，我一直在写全球风险投资总额一路下滑，但需要注意的是：今年的第三季度，是整个风险投资资金大回撤的时间点。

Although at the beginning of this year I have been writing down a downward trend in total global venture capital, it is important to note that the third quarter of this year was the time point for a major repatriation of the entire venture capital.

根据 CBInsights 数据：今年第三季度，全球风险投资总额锐减至 745 亿美元，为九个季度以来的最低水平，季度降幅为 34%，是十年以来的最大降幅。

According to CBInsights, in the third quarter of this year, total global venture investment fell sharply to $74.5 billion, the lowest level since the ninth quarter, with a 34 per cent drop, the largest decline in a decade.

曾经，成为独角兽是多年来创业公司的目标，但现在是“蟑螂时代”——公司要不惜一切代价生存下去。目前，许多年轻公司的生存都受到了质疑，整个创业生态系统面临逆风。

Once, being a unicorn was the goal of many years of start-ups, but now is the era of cockroaches – companies have to survive at all costs. Now, the survival of many young companies is being questioned, and the entire entrepreneurial ecosystem is facing a reverse wind.

（二）

另一方面，Future 当然也不是媒体。

On the other hand, Future is certainly not the media either.

对此，美国独立科技专栏作者本.汤普森有过一段精彩的描述：

In response, Ben Thompson, an independent tech columnist from the United States, described this in an excellent way:

“Future 称：‘我们的视角，是对技术和未来的理性的乐观’。而我作为《纽约时报》的一个长期订阅用户，我认为：《纽约时报》的视角，是对技术及其影响的理性的怀疑。

“Future says, ‘Our perspective is optimism about technology and future rationality’. And as a permanent subscriber to The New York Times, I think the New York Times perspective is a reasonable doubt about technology and its impact.

这其中，值得注意的是：两者如此不同的视角，实际上和他们各自的商业模式，是完全一致的。

Of these, it is worth noting that the two perspectives are so different that they are, in fact, fully consistent with their respective business models.

A16z 的商业模式，当然是风险投资业务。

The A16z business model, of course, is a venture capital business.

温马赫斯在接受彭博社的采访时明确表示：

In an interview with Bloomberg, Wenmahs made it clear that:

‘风险投资中最重要的三件事是：看到交易、挑选交易，以及赢得交易。如果我的职能，能够帮我们看到交易，那么我就为推进 <Future> 做出了贡献。’

"The three most important things in venture capital are: seeing a deal, selecting a deal, and winning a deal. If my function is to help us see a deal, then I'm making a contribution to advancing & lt; Future>."

我写上述这一些是因为：了解商业模式，一直是了解组织行为的最可靠的方法之一。”

I have written some of the above because understanding the business model has been one of the most reliable ways of understanding the behaviour of the organization.”

显然，要理解 A16z 为何关闭 Future，需要先了解一个基本问题：A16z 从哪里来，又要到哪里去？

Obviously, to understand why A16z shuts down Future, one basic question needs to be understood: where does A16z come from and where does it go?

作为美国 VC 圈的后期之秀，A16z 创建于 2009 年，当时两位合伙人想迅速出名，因为在投资圈，交易流就是一切。马克.安德森经常说：“如果你在一家二流机构工作，你永远没有机会接触到一流公司。”

A16z was created in 2009 as a late-stage show in the U.S. V.C., when the two partners wanted to be famous quickly, because in the investment circle, the flow of transactions was everything. Mark Anderson used to say, "If you work in a second-class institution, you never have access to a first-class company."

但此时，A16z 没有知名度，甚至都没有投资案例。换句话说，影响力策略，只是 A16z 投资策略的其中一个手段。

But at this point, A16z has no visibility, not even an investment case. In other words, the impact strategy is just one of the instruments of the A16z investment strategy.

这个手段在一个难得的牛市/抢项目更加激烈的市场，飙升成为了一个更宏大的野心，但随着牛市的枯萎，做这件事的性价比就需要被重新考量了。

This means is a much more intense market in a rare cattle market/treat project, and it is becoming a more ambitious ambition, but as the bull market dries, the value for money to do it needs to be re-evaluated.

正如 Insider 引用消息人士的说法——“A16z 清晰地意识到：鉴于目前机构的知名度，已经不值得花时间和精力来建立一个新的独立品牌。”

As Insider quotes the source — “A16z is clearly aware that given the visibility of the current institution, it is no longer worth the time and effort to build a new independent brand.”

于是其迅速回到了成本更加低的“播客”上——A16z 的底线其实一直是：增加自己机构的影响力，并保持这种能够让创业者最低成本直接触达自己的渠道能力。

It quickly returned to the lower cost of “blowers” — the bottom line of A16z has been, in fact, to increase the influence of its own institutions and to maintain this ability to give entrepreneurs the lowest cost of direct access to their own channels.

如果这就是媒体，那么 A16z 从来就没有放弃过做媒体。

If this is the media, then A16z has never given up on media.

说明：我平时主要在知识星球写美国科技界的内容，关心美国创投圈的专业读者，请移步到我的知识星球。如下扫码登录（老星球用户续费请见底下那个二维码）

Note: I usually write about American science and technology on the knowledge planet, and I care about professional readers of American creative circles. Please move to my knowledge planet.

老用户续费请用这个二维码：

有些人有些事，在正确的时间，出现在了正确的位置。但是没过多久却发现：这原来是一场虚假的繁荣。

Some of them, at the right time, were in the right place. But not long ago, they discovered that it had been a false prosperity.

1月20日周四，一个爆炸性消息传遍了美国科技圈：明星健身公司Peloton被CNBC爆料已暂停生产高端自行车，并计划再暂停生产低端自行车和低端跑步机。

On Thursday, 20 January, an explosive news spread through the United States scientific community: Paloton, a star fitness company, had been suspended by CNBC for the production of high-end bicycles and was planning to suspend further production of low-end bicycles and low-end jockeys.

我说这是一个爆炸性消息是因为：

I said it was an explosive message because:

Peloton经常被与Zoom相提并论，两者都是著名的“疫情股/Stay at home股票”：在疫情初期，两者的业绩和股价都一飞冲天。

Peloton is often compared to Zoom, both of which are famous “epidemiological/stay at home”: in the early days of the epidemic, both performance and share prices were soaring.

其中，Peloton的股价在9个月内涨了8倍多：从2020年初疫情开始时的19.72美元，一举冲到了2020年底时的高点162.72美元。

Among them, the share price of Pelodon rose more than eightfold in nine months: from $19.72 at the beginning of the epidemic in early 2020 to $162.72 at the end of 2020.

以下两张图，我取自于由Coefficient Capital制作的PPT《2021年被改变的消费者趋势》，从中可以看到Peloton的光辉岁月。如下：

The following two graphs, which I take from the PPT " Changing Consumer Trends 2021 ", produced by Coefficient Capital, show the bright years of Peloton:

第一张图告诉我们：Equinox是北美一家豪华型的连锁健身房，会员需要每月缴纳168美金-230美金才能持续使用。但从2020年3月开始，其市占率就被Peloton迅速蚕食，有相当多Equinox会员，把支出转到了Peloton上。

The first tells us that Equinox is a luxury gym chain in North America, with members paying $168 to $230 a month for sustainable use. But since March 2020, the city’s share has been rapidly encroached upon by Peloton, with a significant number of Equinox members shifting their spending to Peloton.

而第二张图，则说明了Peloton的两大指标——订阅数与月活订阅数——都在疫情期间突飞猛进。

The second chart shows that the two major indicators of Peloton — subscriptions and monthly subscriptions — have all made dramatic strides during the epidemic.

Peloton于2019年9月上市，旨在通过让人们在家健身的方式，颠覆性破坏传统面对面的集中式健身，是近年来美国在品牌方面做得最好的创新公司之一。

Peloton, listed in September 2019, is one of the best branding innovation companies in the United States in recent years by destabilizing traditional face-to-face centralized fitness by allowing people to work at home.

很多使用过Peloton的人，都很喜欢它的产品。不少人甚至认为：Peloton是新的苹果，因为它在硬件、软件以及服务这三者之间，找到了让“魔法”发生的相交点。但Peloton的辉煌岁月，肯定是一去不复返了。

A lot of people who used Peloton loved its products. Many even thought that Peloton was a new apple, because it found the intersection between hardware, software, and services that made magic happen. But the glorious days of Peloton must be gone.

就在停产消息爆出当日，Peloton的CEO约翰.福利称这一传言是“假”的，但也同时承认：目前公司正在考虑“所有的选择”，包括大裁员以及限制生产。此外，Peloton已经聘请麦肯锡来帮助削减成本。

On the day of the shutdown, CEO John. Welfare in Peloton claimed that the rumour was “false”, but also admitted that the company was currently considering “all options”, including major layoffs and restrictions on production. Moreover, Peloton had hired McKenzie to help cut costs.

（一）

需要注意的是：Peloton的陨落，并不是突然之间发生的。

It is important to note that the fall of Peloton did not happen suddenly.

让我们先来看一下Peloton的产品线。

Let's take a look at Peloton's product line.

我很喜欢健身，所以几个月前其实我有搜索过中文网络，想看一下目前中国家庭健身的渗透率情况。

I love gymnastics, so I did a search of the Chinese network a few months ago and wanted to see how permeating Chinese home gymnasium is.

其中，翻到一篇演讲，讲到为什么Peloton的模式无法在中国复制。演讲7000多字，从什么是对商业本质的思考，一路论证到了拼多多和小米。但是从我作为一个用户最直观的感觉看，除了两个国家健身习惯有差异外，演讲其实漏掉了Peloton模式不能够在中国复制的一个最朴素的原因。

Of these, it turns to a speech on why the Peloton model cannot be replicated in China. More than 7,000 words, from what is considered to the nature of business, have been demonstrated to how much it is and how much rice it is. But from my most intuitive sense as a user, apart from the difference in fitness habits between the two countries, the speech actually missed one of the most simple reasons why the Peloton model could not be replicated in China.

那就是：美国家庭的房屋面积比中国大太多了。

That is, the size of the American family is far greater than that of China.

美国国家面积与中国差不多，但人口却只有3亿多。实际上，美国房屋是世界上最大的房屋之一（如果不是最大的话）。

The size of the United States is similar to that of China, but it has a population of more than 300 million. In fact, American housing is one of the largest, if not the largest, in the world.

2019年时，《大西洋月刊》就曾经专门写过一篇文章，叫《为什么美国的房子那么大？》，指出：

In 2019, the Atlantic Monthly wrote a special article, " Why is the house so big in America? ", stating:

美国家庭单户住宅（Single Family）的中位面积，约在1600-1650平方英尺之间。也就是：在149平方米-153平方米之间。就更不用说，Peloton主打的是中高端用户了。

The median size of a single-house home in the United States is between 1600 and 1650 square feet, that is, between 149 and 153 square metres. Not to mention, Pelodon's main hit is on mid- and high-end users.

所以Peloton最主要的产品/公司收入，就是让你把它昂贵、但是精密的联网自行车或跑步机，买回家。

So the most important product/corporate income of Peloton is for you to buy it home with expensive, yet sophisticated, web-based bicycles or jockeys.

此外，它还提供一个健身课程App，允许任何人订阅。但非Peloton的硬件会员，每月订阅费用是12.99美元；而Peloton的硬件会员，则每月订阅费用是39美元。

In addition, it offers a gymnasium course App, which allows anyone to subscribe. However, non-Peloton hardware members have a subscription fee of $12.99 per month, while Peloton hardware members have a subscription fee of $39 per month.

为什么这里，反而是Peloton的硬件会员需要缴纳更多订阅费呢？

Why do the hardware members of Peloton have to pay more subscriptions here instead?

……

本文剩余内容的主要摘要如下：

1，在订阅App健身课程方面，为什么反而Peloton的硬件会员需要比非硬件会员支付更多订阅费？
2，Peloton如何考虑它的可服务的可寻址市场（SAM）以及总的可寻址市场（TAM）？
3，根据Peloton的招股说明书和财报：其自上市以来，收入和数字订阅客户数都实现了三位数的增长，且创造了一种粘性很高的商业模式（App数字订阅业务的流失率相当低）。Peloton到底发生了什么事？为什么现在整个事情一团乱麻，甚至激进投资者在上书董事会要求公司CEO和联合创始人辞职，并探索把Peloton卖了的可能性？
4，哪些服务类型，适合在家里消费？而哪些，则可能不是最优选择？

1 In terms of subscriptions to the App gymnasium courses, why on the contrary would Peloton's hardware members have to pay more subscriptions than non-hardware members?
2, how did Peloton consider its serviceable and searchable market (SAM)?
3, based on Peloton's stock offers and financial reports: since it was listed, its income and digital subscriptions have increased by three figures and created a more sticky business model (the rate of loss of App's digital subscriptions is quite low). What is going on in Peloton? Why is it a mess and even radical investors asking CEOs and co-founders to resign and explore the possibility of selling Peloton?
4, which service types are suitable for home consumption?

说明：因为各种各样的原因，我在微信公号写的东西和我在知识星球写的不太一样，关心美国创投圈的专业读者，请移步到我的知识星球。如下扫码登录（老星球用户续费请见底下那个二维码）

Note: For a variety of reasons, what I wrote on the microsatellite is different from what I wrote on the knowledge planet, interested in professional readers of American creative circles, please move to my knowledge planet.

老星球用户续费请用这个二维码：

昨晚纳指又再下挫，从而把今年纳斯达克指数的下跌幅度推高到了-10%以上（详见《纳斯达克指数暴跌与风险投资暴涨》）。

The fall in the NASDAQ index this year was again frustrated last night, thus pushing it up to more than -10 per cent (for more details, see ).

上周末，似乎美国科技界的每个人都在读莫西.马林斯派克的一篇博客。

Last weekend, it seemed that everyone in the scientific and technological community in the United States was reading a blog by Mossi Malinspec.

莫西.马林斯派克是全球最著名的端到端加密的即时通讯服务之一Signal的联合创始人。

Mossi Malinspec is a co-founder of Signal, one of the world's most well-known end-to-end encryption instant messaging services.

他也是著名的密码学专家、网络安全先驱，以及科技方面的全能聪明人。

He is also a well-known cryptographer, a pioneer in cybersecurity, and a brilliant intellectual in science and technology.

马林斯派克的这篇文章，是对Web3现有事物运作方式的一个严重控诉，并触及了Web3领域内最重要的矛盾之一：Web3真的是去中心化的吗？

This article by Malinspike is a serious complaint about the way web3 works and touches on one of the most important contradictions in the area of Web3: Is Web3 really decentralized?

尽管博客发布于上周五，但它在周末以及本周都在一直掀起波澜，引发了相当多辩论。

Despite the fact that the blog was published last Friday, it has been provoking much debate on weekends and this week.

这篇文章值得一读。以下，是我对马林斯派克这篇文章的一个翻译简写。

This article is worth reading. Here's a short translation of my article on Malinspec.

《我对Web3的第一印象》

"My first impression of Web3."

尽管我认为我是一名密码学家，但是我没有被“加密”所特别地吸引。

Although I think I am a cryptographer, I am not particularly attracted to encryption.

我不认为我真的说过“离开我的领域”这句话，但我更有可能去点击Pepperidge Farm Remembers上的Meme图，以了解“加密”这个词过去指的其实是“密码学”，而现在更多指的是NFT空投。（PS：这里有美国meme文化的梗）?

I don't think I really said, "Get out of my field," but I'm more likely to click on the Meme map on Pepperidge Farm Rembers to understand that the word "encryption" used to refer to " cryptography," and more to NFT airdrops.

另外我也要说明一下：我个人没有我们这一代人对将生活的方方面面都转到仪器化经济中的那种兴奋。?

I would also like to say that I am not personally as excited as our generation to transfer all aspects of life to the instrumentized economy?

即便是从严格意义上的技术层面讲，我也还没能成为一名信仰者。因此，考虑到最近对现在被称为Web3的东西的所有关注，我决定更彻底地探索在这个领域内所发生的一些事，看看我可能错过了什么。

Even technically, I haven't been a believer yet. So, given all the recent concerns about what is now called Web3, I have decided to explore more thoroughly what is happening in this field and see what I may have missed.

一，我如何看待Web1和Web2

One, how do I see Web1 and Web2?

Web3是一个有点模糊的术语，很难严格评估Web3的野心应该是什么，但总体论点似乎是：

Web3 is a somewhat vague term that makes it difficult to critically assess what the ambitions of Web3 should be, but the overall argument seems to be:

Web1是去中心化的；Web2将一切都集中到平台上；而Web3，将再次把一切去中心化。Web3应该给我们Web2的丰富性，但是，它去中心化。

Web1 is decentralised; Web2 focuses everything on the platform; and Web3 is going to decentralize everything again. Web3 should give us the richness of Web2, but it's decentralized.

那么，究竟为什么“中心化平台”会出现呢？了解一下原因是好事。我认为解释其实很简单，如下：

So why on earth would a "centralized platform" happen? It's good to know why. I think the explanation is really simple, as follows:

# 1，人们不想运行自己的服务器，而且永远也不会运行自己的服务器。

#1 People do not want to run their own servers and will never run their own servers.

Web1的前提是：互联网上的每个人，都既是内容的发布者和消费者，也是基础设施的发布者和消费者。

The premise of Web1 is that everyone on the Internet is both the publisher and consumer of content, as well as of infrastructure.

当时，互联网上的每个人（PS：其实指极客），都有自己网站的网络服务器，都有自己电邮的邮件服务器，都有自己状态信息的finger server，都有用于生成自己字符的chargen server。但这不是人们想要的。我认为这一点再怎么强调都不为过：人们并不想运行自己的服务器。

At the time, everyone on the Internet (PS: in fact extremers) had a web server for their own website, an email server for their own emails, a feeder server for their own state, and a chargen server for their own character. But that was not what people wanted. I don't think that's enough: people don't want to run their own servers.

即便是书呆子，也不想；即便是全职工作以建立软件的组织，也不想。如果有一件事我希望大家了解这个世界的真相，那就是：人们不希望运行自己的服务器。因此，为你提供这些服务的公司是成功的，而那些根据这些网络的可能性迭代新功能的公司则更加成功。

Not even nerds; not even organizations that work full-time to build software. If there is one thing I want you to know about the world: people don't want to run their own servers. So the companies that provide these services are successful, and the companies that replace new functions based on the possibilities of these networks are more successful.

# 2，一个协议，要比一个平台的发展慢很多。

# Two, an agreement, is much slower to develop than a platform.

30多年后，我们的电子邮件仍然是未加密的；与此同时WhatsApp在一年内，从未加密到完全的端到端加密。人们仍在尝试通过IRC来可靠地标准化地分享视频；同时Slack让你根据你的脸来创建自定义的表情符号。

More than 30 years later, our e-mail remains unencrypted; at the same time, WhatsApp never encrypts to full end-to-end encryption in a year. People are still trying to reliably and standardized video sharing through IRC; and Slack allows you to create custom emoticons based on your face.

这不是钱的问题。问题是：如果一个东西是真正去中心化的，那么它就会变得非常地难以改变，而且经常在时间方面卡住。

It's not about money. The problem is that if something is really decentralized, it becomes very difficult to change and often gets stuck in time.

而这对技术来说是一个问题，因为生态系统的其他部分发展得非常快，你跟不上，就会失败。这里，有整个行业来专注于定义和改进像Agile这样的方法论，以试图找出如何组织庞大的用户，使他们能尽可能快地使用自己的去中心化服务，因为这个问题是如此关键。

And that's a problem for technology, because the rest of the ecosystem is growing very fast, and you can't keep up with it, and you fail. Here, the whole industry focuses on defining and improving methodologies like Agile, trying to figure out how to organize large users so that they can use their own decentralized services as quickly as possible, because this is so critical.

当技术本身更有利于停滞而不是运动时，这就是一个问题。而成功的秘诀是：采用90年代的协议，将其集中化，并快速迭代。

This is a problem when technology itself favours stagnation rather than movement. The secret to success is to adopt the 1990s agreements, centralize them, and quickly overlap.

但Web3打算与众不同，所以让我们来看看。为快速感受Web3并更好地了解未来可能出现的情况，我决定建立几个DApps并创建一个NFT。

But Web3 is going to be different, so let's see. To get a quick look at Web3 and get a better idea of what's going to happen in the future, I decided to build a few Dapps and create a NFT.

二，制作一些分布式应用

Two, make some distributed applications.

我做了一个名叫Autonomous Art的dApp，让任何人可以通过对NFT做出视觉贡献，来铸造一个代币。

I made a dapp called Autonomous Art so that anyone could make a token by making visual contributions to NFT.

视觉贡献的成本随时间推移而增加，贡献者支付的铸币资金会分配给所有以前的艺术家。在写这篇文章时，已有超过3.8万美元用于创造这个集体艺术作品。

The cost of visual contributions increases over time, and the money paid by the contributor is allocated to all former artists. At the time of writing, more than $38,000 has been spent on creating this collective art work.

此外我还做了一个名为First Derivative的DApp，允许你创建、发现及交换追踪基础NFT的NFT衍生品，类似于追踪基础资产的金融衍生品。

In addition, I made a Dapp called First Derivative, which allows you to create, detect and exchange NFT derivatives that track base NFTs, similar to financial derivatives that track underlying assets.

这两者，都让我感受到了Web3是如何运作的。

Both make me feel how Web3 works.

明确地说：如果“分布式”是指状态和更新状态的逻辑/权限所在：是在区块链上，而不是在“集中式”的数据库中，那么，这些应用程序本身其实没有什么特别的“分布式”，它们实际上只是普通的响应网站。

To be clear: if the “distribution” refers to the logic/authority of the state of status and updating: it is on the block chain rather than in the “centralized” database, the applications themselves do not have any particular “distribution” and they are actually just ordinary response websites.

关于加密世界，我一直觉得有一件事很奇怪，那就是：缺乏对客户端/服务器界面的关注。

One thing I've always felt strange about the encryption world is the lack of attention to the client/server interface.

当人们谈论区块链时，他们谈论分布式信任、无领导的共识，以及所有这些工作的机制，但是却往往掩盖了客户端最终不能参与这些机制的现实。

When people talk about block chains, they talk about distributed trust, unled consensus and the mechanisms for all of these, but they often hide the reality that clients are ultimately unable to participate in these mechanisms.

所有的网络图都是服务器的，信任模型是在服务器之间，一切都与服务器有关。区块链旨在成为对等点网络，但其设计目的，并不是让用户的移动设备或浏览器真的有可能成为这些对等点之一。

All network maps are servers, trust models are between servers, and everything is related to servers. Block chains are designed to be peer networks, but they are not designed to make the user's mobile devices or browsers one of these.

随着向移动设备的转变，我们现在牢牢生活在一个客户端和服务器的世界里——前者，完全无法充当后者——这些问题对我来说似乎比以往任何时候都更重要。同时，以太坊实际上将服务器称为“客户端”，因此，甚至没有一个词来描述必须存在于某处的实际不受信任的客户端/服务器接口，并且没有人承认如果成功，最终会有数十亿（！）服务器。

With the shift to mobile devices, we now live firmly in a world of clients – the former, who are simply unable to act as the latter – issues that seem more important to me than ever before. At the same time, Taiwan actually calls the servers “clients”, so there is no even a word to describe the actual untrusted client/server interface that must exist somewhere, and no one admits that if it succeeds, billions (!) of servers will eventually come.

例如，无论它是在移动端还是在网络上运行，像是Autonomous Art或者是First Derivative这样的dApp，都需要以某种方式与区块链互动，以便修改或呈现状态（集体制作的艺术作品、它的编辑历史、NFT衍生品等）。但这在客户端，是不可能做到的，因为区块链不可能存在于你的移动设备上（或现实中的桌面浏览器上）。因此，唯一的选择是，通过在某个服务器上远程运行的节点与区块链互动。

For example, whether it operates on a mobile end or on a network, such as Autonomous Art or First Derivative, dApp, needs to interact with the block chain in some way in order to modify or present it (collective artistic work, its editorial history, NFT derivatives, etc.). This is not possible on the client side, because the block chain cannot exist on your mobile device (or on a real desktop browser). The only option is therefore to interact with the block chain through a node that runs remotely on a server.

一台服务器！但是，正如我们前面说过的，人们不想运行自己的服务器。而现在，已经出现了一些公司，他们将以太坊节点的API访问，作为一项服务出售，同时还提供分析、他们在默认的以太坊API之上建立的增强型API，以及对历史交易的访问。这听起来……很熟悉。在这一点上，基本上有两家公司。几乎所有的dApps都使用这两家公司以便与区块链互动，他们是：Infura或是Alchemy。

A server! But, as we said earlier, people don't want to run their own servers. Now, there are companies that have come up that have access to API at the Taipan node, which they sell as a service, as well as analysis, the enhanced API that they have built on Tai node API by default, and access to historical transactions. That sounds familiar. There are basically two companies on this. Almost all dapps use them to interact with the block chain: Infura or Alchemy.

事实上，即使你把MetaMask这样的钱包，连接到dApp上，dApp通过你的钱包与区块链互动，MetaMask也只是在调用Infura！

In fact, even if you connect a wallet like MetaMask to dapp, dapp interacts with the block chain through your wallet, MetaMask is just calling Infoura!

这些客户端API，没有使用任何东西来验证区块链状态或响应的真实性。结果甚至没有签名。像Autonomous Art这样的应用程序说：”嘿，这个智能合约上的这个视图函数的输出是什么？”Alchemy或者Infura回应了一个JSON Blob，说“这是输出”，然后，应用程序渲染了它。

These clients API do not use anything to verify the trueness of the block chain status or response. The result is not even signed. An application like Autonomous Art says: #821; hey, what is the output of this view function on this smart contract? #8221; Alchemy or Infoura responded to a JSON Blob, saying, "This is the output," and then the application rewrites it.

这让我很惊讶。大家已经为创建一个无信任的分布式共识机制付出了如此多的工作、精力和时间，但是几乎所有希望访问它的客户端，都是通过简单地信任这两家公司的输出，而没有任何进一步的验证。

This surprises me. So much work, energy and time have been devoted to creating an untrusted distributed consensus mechanism, but almost all of the clients who want to visit it simply trust the output of these two companies without any further validation.

……

……

需要大家到我的知识星球阅读全文。

You need to go to my knowledge planet to read the full text.

说明：因为各种各样的原因，我在微信公号写的东西和我在知识星球写的不太一样，关心美国创投圈的专业读者，请移步到我的知识星球。如下扫码登录（老星球用户续费请见底下那个二维码）

Note: For a variety of reasons, what I wrote on the microsatellite is different from what I wrote on the knowledge planet, interested in professional readers of American creative circles, please move to my knowledge planet.

老星球用户续费请用这个二维码：

我最近买了一本书，是李彦宏的《智能交通》，起因是：听了罗振宇今年改为云直播的跨年演讲，其中老罗提到了李彦宏书中的一个细节：5G云代驾。

I recently bought a book, Le Ying Hong's " Smart Traffic ", which was the result of an inter-annual lecture that Rho Jin-woo turned into a live cloud this year, in which he referred to one of the details of Li Ying Hong's book: 5G Clouds.

意思是：短期内，如果技术上100%的自动驾驶达不到，那么就可以用人工实现双保险，即：当自动驾驶车辆在路上遇到复杂状况时，第一时间人工接管。

It means that, in the short term, if 100 per cent of the technical autopilots are not achieved, then a manual double-insurance can be achieved, i.e. when an auto-drive vehicle is in a complicated condition on the road, it is taken over manually at the first time.

也就是说：深夜里，成都街头奔跑的一辆车，实际上可能是一个住在青城山脚下的老司机在监管着。

In other words, late in the night, a vehicle running on the streets of Chengdu may actually be under the supervision of an old driver living at the foot of a mountain.

我听了有点困惑：这样做真的安全吗？所以买了书，准备好好看一看。

I was a little confused: is this really safe? So I bought a book, and I was ready to take a look.

关于智能交通，其实中外大佬们都有过很多系统性思考。比如美国专注于颠覆性技术的作家、连环创业者鲁特.布里奇斯。

With regard to smart traffic, there's actually a lot of systemic thinking in the middle and south. For example, in the United States, writers and serial entrepreneurs who focus on subversive technologies, Ruth Bridges.

三年前，我写过一篇介绍布里奇斯最新思想的文章。当时，文章写了我整整20多天，因为首先要看完英文书，然后，还要做很多数学题。但是因为当时我在美国，不了解国内的数字付费阅读基础设施，所以我把文章的首发权，卖给了国内的门户网站。现在有了我自己的知识星球，以后我看到任何第一手信息，都会集中写在我的知识星球里。

Three years ago, I wrote an article about Bridges’ latest ideas. At the time, I wrote it for more than 20 days, because first I read the English book, then I had to do a lot of math. But because I didn’t know the digital-paying reading infrastructure in the United States, I sold it to the national portal. Now I have my own planet of knowledge, and any first-hand information I see will focus on my planet of knowledge.

最后：我的这篇文章写于2019年的年初，以下是文章正文。

Finally: My article was written at the beginning of 2019, and the following is the text of the article.

遗憾的是，时至今日，鲁特.布里奇斯的这两本书，分别出版于——2015年的5月和2018年的6月，都没有引进中国。

Unfortunately, to date, the two books by Ruth Bridges, published in May 2015 and June 2018, respectively, have not been introduced into China.

（一）

有关于自动驾驶的大规模应用，一个公认的时间拐点是：2027年。

With regard to the large-scale application of autopilot, one recognized point in time is 2027.

到了2027，自动驾驶的大规模普及将创造出巨大的经济效益。但如果这一新技术没有被“深思熟虑”地部署，它将给全世界带来空前的灾难。为什么这么说呢？

By 2027, large-scale diffusion of autopilots would have created huge economic benefits. If this new technology is not deployed “intendedly,” it would have caused unprecedented disaster throughout the world.

让我们以美国市场为例，来看三张图。第一张图，是美国高峰时段的交通现状。如下图：

Let's take the United States market, for example, and look at three. The first is the current state of traffic at the peak in the United States.

经历过加州堵车的人都知道：那种奔溃感，丝毫不比北京和上海的早高峰和晚高峰逊色。美国曾花了1650亿美金来改造高速公路，并花了650亿美金改造大规模运输，但是仍然没有解决拥堵问题。

Those who have experienced traffic jams in California know that this sense of voluminousness is no worse than the early and late peaks in Beijing and Shanghai. The US spent $165 billion to renovate highways and $65 billion to renovate large-scale transport, but the congestion problem remains unresolved.

第二张图，则十分有趣了。

The second picture, it's very interesting.

它告诉我们：诡异的是，如果把图中的左图和右图做对比，那么，美国其实没有拥堵。真正的问题在于：太多的车里面，坐的是一个人。也就是说：这是一个简单的车辆配置问题，而不是公路资源问题。为进一步做说明，我们再来看第三张图，如下：

It tells us that if we compare the left to the right, then there is no congestion in the United States. The real problem with is that too many cars are in one person. means is a simple vehicle allocation issue, not a road resource issue. for further explanation, let's look at the third map, as follows:

这是2016年美国的“通勤方式”分布图。按图中所示：在2016年，美国人一个人独自开车的情况，占到了总通勤方式的76.3%，甚至占到总开车人数的9/10。

This is the United States “commuting mode” map for 2016. As shown in the figure: in 2016, Americans drove alone, accounting for 76.3 per cent of total commuting and even 9/10 per cent of total driving.

也就是说：在10个开车的人里面，就有9个人，是独自一人开车的。

In other words, of the 10 drivers, 9 were driving alone.

而“合伙开车”，仅占到了9%。

And it's only 9%.

合伙开车是美国的一个发明。为减少交通拥堵和空气污染，美国自1969年始，在高速上设置了一条合伙开车道Carpool Lane，专门供车里坐了两个人或以上的车辆通行。它的好处在车流高峰期时非常明显，如下图：

In order to reduce traffic congestion and air pollution, the United States has, since 1969, set up a joint driveway, Carpol Lane, dedicated to two or more cars. Its benefits are evident at the peak of the traffic, as follows:

但合伙开车道的有效性值得怀疑。因为拥堵带来的痛苦，似乎无法刺激它的使用。

But the effectiveness of the joint drive is questionable. The pain caused by congestion does not seem to stimulate its use.

事实上，真正能影响它使用的，只有一个东西——油价。

In fact, there is only one thing that really affects its use — the price of oil.

美国的石油依赖进口，1973年石油禁运以来，石油输出国组织和苏联就控制了石油的价格。我们来看几组数据：

American oil imports depend on imports, and oil prices have been controlled by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Soviet Union since the 1973 oil embargo.

美国合伙开车道的使用，在1970年达到高峰，为20.4%，但到了2011年，下降到9.7%，这在很大程度上，要归因于20世纪80年代油价的大幅下跌。

The use of the United States motorway, which peaked in 1970 at 20.4 per cent, fell to 9.7 per cent in 2011, largely due to the sharp fall in oil prices in the 1980s.

合伙开车道的无效性，也说明了——我们“单人独占一辆车”习惯的顽固性。那么，到了无人驾驶时代，还会发生什么呢？

The ineffectiveness of the joint driveway is also an illustration of the persistence of our “one-man-one-car” habit. So, what happens in the age of unmanned driving?

首先，原来行动不便的人群，也将加入移动大潮，包括：老人、残疾人等。其次，更多人会想住得离市中心远一点。再次，因为无人车的成本极低，一些人可能会频繁让“空车”自己开回家去取东西，或是让空车自己开回家，去供家里的其他人使用。

First of all, the people who were unable to move would join the movement wave, including the elderly, the disabled, and so on. Second, more people would want to live a little further away from the city. And again, because the cost of an empty car is extremely low, some people might often let “empty cars” drive home to pick up their own things, or leave them to drive home for the rest of the family.

换句话说：造成一个城市交通拥堵的三大要素——车辆、车程，以及空车率，都将增多。

In other words, the three main factors that cause traffic congestion in a city — vehicles, distances and empty traffic rates — will increase.

简而言之：无人驾驶解决不了拥堵。事实上，如果不好好做规划，这一新技术将起到很强的反噬作用，进而把我们的交通完全毁灭。

In short: Unmanned can't solve congestion. In fact, without good planning, this new technology will be a powerful counter-defeating force, which will completely destroy our traffic.

那么，我们该怎么办呢？

So, what do we do?

（二）

这是鲁特.布里奇斯在他的新书《我们自动驾驶的未来：天堂还是地狱？》里提出的一个问题。

This is a question that Ruth Bridges raised in his new book, Our Auto-Driving Future: Heaven or Hell?

2015年5月，他出版了有关自动驾驶的第一本书《无人车的革命》，完美预测了今天我们看到的自动驾驶行业快速发展的很多细节。但在2018年底，他突然提出了一个全新的、尖锐的问题。

In May 2015, he published his first book on autopilot, The Unmanned Revolution, which perfectly predicts many of the details of the rapid growth of the autopilot industry that we see today. But at the end of 2018, he suddenly raised a whole new and sharp question.

他指出：现在，美国平均一辆车，坐着1.06个人。按这一数据，到2027年，（即便不考虑无人车带来的增量），美国会需要有1.144亿辆的车，来搭载1.213亿人。

He pointed out that the United States now has an average car with 1.06 people. According to this figure, by 2027 (even without taking into account the increase in the number of unmanned vehicles), the United States would need 114.4 million cars to carry 121.3 million people.

“但目前美国交通高峰期的9900万辆车，已经让公路系统拥堵不堪。到了2027年，美国的公路系统如何去承载这1.144亿的车呢？”布里奇斯问。

“But the 99 million vehicles that are currently in peak traffic in the United States are already jamming the road system. By 2027, how does the American road system carry the 114.4 million cars?” Bridges asks.

除非，找到一个解决方案。但这个解决方案，绝不能是最具破坏性、也最为昂贵的公路扩建。

Unless a solution is found. But it must not be the most destructive and expensive road expansion.

（三）

有意思的是，前面我们已经说过：美国的“拥堵”，实际上不是公路资源问题，而是一个车辆配置问题。

Interestingly, as we have already said, the “crowding” of the United States is not actually a matter of road resources, but rather of vehicle allocation.

从这个角度看，传统“多人共乘”的公交系统，其实是能够解决城市拥堵的。

From this point of view, the traditional “man-in-man” bus system can actually address urban congestion.

但美国的公交系统，已经接近死亡。

But the U.S. bus system is nearing death.

在2016年，公交作为一种通勤方式，在美国的总通勤方式中仅占到了5.1%。而根据《华尔街日报》的报道：在2017年的第二季度，全美国公交乘客的数量，比十年前同期下降了13%。

In 2016, as a commuter mode, bus traffic accounted for only 5.1 per cent of the total commuter mode in the United States, while, according to the Wall Street Journal, in the second quarter of 2017, the number of bus passengers across the United States fell by 13 per cent compared to the same period 10 years ago.

这一部分原因，是2009年美国经济危机后一些财政困难的城市削减公车服务造成的。但其他因素，也在加剧这一趋势。

This is partly due to cuts in bus services in financially difficult cities following the 2009 United States economic crisis, but other factors are also exacerbating this trend.

比如说：Uber和Lyft等打车软件的兴起。

For example: the rise of car-crowding software such as Uber and Lyft.

根据2018年10月加州大学-戴维斯交通研究所的一份研究报告：自打车软件提供更方便的“点到点”的服务以来，芝加哥的公交系统使用率下降了6%。

According to a study by the University of California-Davis Institute of Transport Studies in October 2018, the use of the public transport system in Chicago has decreased by 6 per cent since car-caring software provided a more convenient “point-to-point” service.

而在一些更“闭环”的环境，这种冲击就更明显了，比如说：机场。

In some more “closed” environments, such shocks are even more evident, for example, airports.

根据《经济学人》的报道，Uber和Lyft等打车软件服务，使北美的许多机场遭到冲击。

According to The Economist, many airports in North America were hit by vehicle-caring software services such as Uber and Lyft.

这些机场面临的威胁是：原来停车场的收入（占非航空收入的2/5）和汽车租赁优惠（占非航空收入的1/5）减少了。每一年，停车场的收入都比原预期的要少上10%或者更多。

These airports are under threat of a decrease in revenue from the original garage (2/5 of non-aerial revenue) and a reduction in car rental privileges (1/5 of non-aerial revenue).

《经济学人》引用了咨询公司LEK Consulting的数据称：

The Economist quoted data from the consulting firm, Lek Consulting:

“2014至2017年间，美国商务旅行中用这类打车应用的比例，从8%飙升到了62%；而乘坐出租车的比例，则从37%下降到了8%。租来的汽车数量，也从55%下降到了30%。”

“The proportion of United States commercial travel using such taxis rose sharply from 8 per cent to 62 per cent between 2014 and 2017, while the proportion of taxis dropped from 37 per cent to 8 per cent. The number of cars rented also dropped from 55 per cent to 30 per cent.”

这样的趋势，从根本上冲击了机场的财务收入。

This trend has fundamentally affected the airport's financial revenues.

因为Uber和Lyft的接送服务，在机场赚的钱，不如出租车多。出租车每次出行平均为机场带来3.5美元，但一款叫车应用带来的每辆车，只给机场带来2.90美元的收入。

The airport earns less money than taxis because of the Uber and Lyft delivery services.

“更糟的是，当无人车时代完全来临，机场怎么办？”《经济学人》称：“无人车甚至可以在人们下车之后自己开走，这也就意味着：机场的停车设施费用，也不用支付了。”

“To make matters worse, what about the airport when the era of unmanned vehicles has come to an end?” The Economist says: “Nobody can even drive themselves after people get out of the car, which means that parking facilities at the airport are not paid for.”

这将对机场构成直接的威胁。

This would pose a direct threat to the airport.

但其实，鲁特.布里奇斯在2015年就预测了这样的结果。

But, in fact, Ruth Bridges predicted such a result in 2015.

他在2015年出版的《无人车的革命》一书中提到：无人车的最佳商业策略，是像Uber那样去“出租”，这将保证无人车能在最短时间内被最多人使用，而只要使用的人数达到足够规模，运营商就能把成本降到不能想象的低。这是无人车移动出租服务经济模式最可怕的地方。

In his book The Unmanned Revolution, published in 2015, he mentioned that the best business strategy for unmanned vehicles is to “rent” like Uber, which will ensure that no one can be used by the largest number of people in the shortest possible time, and that operators can reduce their costs to unimaginable proportions as long as the number of people they use is sufficient. This is the worst part of the economic model for mobile rental services.

现在，跟我来看一下我手机上的Lyft：

Now, come with me and take a look at Lyft on my phone:

目前，我们使用Uber或Lyft的成本，是约每英里2美金，而这已经造成一些经济形态的改变。

At present, the cost of using Uber or Lyft is about $2 per mile, which has led to some changes in economic patterns.

那么，当Uber或者Lyft车子里的司机（人工费）都没有了的时候，这种拥有极低成本竞争优势的服务形态，将很快占领绝大部分的出行市场。

So, when the drivers in the Uber or Lyft car (manual fees) are gone, this pattern of services with a very low-cost competitive advantage will soon take over the vast majority of the travel market.

然而这个时候，我们“单人独占一辆车”的驾驶习惯，却没有改变。而由于无人车的普及，导致城市拥堵的三大要素：车辆、车程以及空车率，都将增多。地面交通，将拥堵不堪。

At this point, however, our “one-man-one-car” driving habits have not changed. And, as a result of the widespread use of unmanned vehicles, three major factors of urban congestion are likely to increase: vehicles, distances, and empty traffic.

换句话说：重新发明公共交通，从未像现在如此紧迫。

In other words, re-inventing public transport has never been more urgent.

（四）

那么，具备什么样特点的公交系统，才能够重新吸引我们呢？

So, what are the characteristics of a public transport system that can re-engineer us?

我们可以暂时把这种超级无人公交车，称之为是：eSAVs（其中e指Electric；S指Shared；A指Autonomous；V指Vehicles）。

We can call this super-unmanned bus, for the time being, eSAVs (e for Electric; S for Shared; A for Autonomous; V for Vehicles).

在布里奇斯的设想中，它必须具备以下特点：

In its vision of Bridges, it must have the following characteristics:

第一，它必须和打车App一样，能够“召之即来、挥之即去”。

First, it must be able to “call and move on” like a taxiing App.

关于这一点，没有比之前云九资本董事总经理邱谆在接受硅发布采访时的一段说明，更好的解释了。2017年，邱谆曾以“共享单车”为例，说到了为什么“无人车”这件事一定会发生，他说：

In this regard, there is no better explanation than a note from the former director-general of Yun Koo Capital in an interview with Silicon. In 2017, Qiu Yi used the term “shared bicycle” as an example, saying why this “no one car” must have happened, he said:

“前几年中国骑自行车的人越来越少，但为什么共享单车出来后，骑自行车的人又回来了呢？这是因为，以前骑单车一个很大问题是：人们想要用车时就用，用完就走，这在以前用自己买单车方式实现不了。‘共享单车’模式彻底改变了这种格局，创造了一种‘按需’模式，核心其实不是‘共享’，而是‘按需’。

“China has seen fewer bikers in the last few years, but why have the bikers come back when they share the bikes? Because a big problem before is that people used them when they wanted to use them, running away when they wanted to, which was impossible to do in the past by buying their own bikes. The “shared bike” model has completely changed the pattern, creating a “demand-on-demand” model, the core of which is not really “shared” but “br-on-demand”.

延伸到汽车行业也一样。

The same goes for the automobile industry.

我想要一辆车时，车会自己出现。上去后，不管我开还是它开，其实不是问题的关键，关键是：我到目的地后，下车走人就可以了，不用管车怎么停，或还要回去再找。也就是说，任何时候车都能出现，并用完就走。而要实现这点，就必须有无人驾驶，因为如果有人工司机，那么从‘经济角度’和‘运营角度’成本上都实现不了，必须是它自己开过来，然后到目的地后还能自己开走，去找停车位和充电桩。这是无人驾驶带来的重大意义，也是投资逻辑上，为什么我们要投无人车。大家投的，其实不是无人车，而是整个出行的下一个模式。”

I want a car when I want it to appear. When I go up, whether I drive it or I drive it, it's not the key. The point is that when I get to the destination, I get out of the car and I don't have to stop the car, or I'm going back. That means that whenever a car shows up, I'm going to go. And if I do that, there must be an unmanned driver, because if there's an artificial driver, there's no cost from the `economic' and `operational' angle, it must be driven over, then it can drive out on its own to the destination, find a parking spot and a charge. That's the significance of being unmanned, the logic of the investment, why we're dropping a vehicle.

根据布里奇斯的描述：无论你身在何处，这些eSAVs会在3分钟内到达。

According to Bridges: wherever you are, these eSAVs will arrive in three minutes.

第二，必须要有三个版本，以消除目前公车座位浪费、非高峰期空乘率太高等问题。

Secondly, there must be three versions in order to eliminate the current waste of seating in buses and the high non-peak-time occupancy rate.

布里奇斯认为：这些新型工具应该分为2人版、4人版和10人版。我们可以先假设叫它们为：eSAV-2s、eSAV-4s和eSAV-10s。

Bridges argues that these new tools should be divided into 2-, 4- and 10-person versions. We can assume that they are called eSAV-2s, eSAV-4s and eSAV-10s.

第三，为了消除乘客心里的“不安全感”，每一个人都必须注册。

Thirdly, in order to eliminate the sense of insecurity in the passenger's heart, everyone must be registered.

是的，就像使用操作系统一样，当你第一次坐车时，需要注册。你需要提供有效的照片ID，供eSAVs扫描检测。

Yeah, like using an operating system, you need to register when you're first in a car. You need to provide an effective photo ID for the eSAVs scan.

之后每次乘车，车都会在你进入前进行识别，如果你外貌发生了变化，可以启动备用的语音签名。

Each time after that, the car will be identified before you enter, and if you change your appearance, you can activate the backup voice signature.

如果你是缓刑者或正处于保释期，则必须始终是一个人乘车。而如果你是通缉犯，那么一上车，你就自动被eSAVs带警察局去了，附近的警察会提前得到通知。

If you are a probationer or on bail, you must always be in a car. If you are a wanted criminal, you will automatically be taken to the police station by eSAVs, and the nearest police will be notified in advance.

它甚至还有一些这样的细节。比如说，美国人不喜欢别人知道自己住哪，以防被人持枪抢劫。那么，如何保护个人的住址隐私呢？

It even has such details. Americans, for example, do not like to know where they live in order to avoid being robbed with a gun. How, then, is it possible to protect the privacy of a person's address?

布里奇斯给出的解决方案是这样的：

The solution for Bridges is as follows:

假设你是第一个上车的人，你可以抬起一个智能屏，将它锁定；当第二个人上车前的一、二个街区，你的智能窗户就会自动变暗；而在你下车前，另一名乘客的智能窗户也如此。

Assuming you're the first person to get in the car, you can lift up a smart screen and lock it; when a second person gets in one or two blocks before getting in, your smart window will automatically get dark; and before you get out, the smart window of another passenger will be the same.

这一智能窗户，还可以让你有小睡的隐私。

This smart window also allows you to sleep in privacy.

第四，交互和导航。

Fourth, interaction and navigation.

有趣的是：前几年，中国出租车里前排座位后背的广告屏，在这里，将变成乘客与eSAVs的交互界面。

Interestingly, in previous years, the advertising screen behind the front seat in a Chinese taxi would become an interface between passengers and eSAVs.

而因为这其实已经进入“物联网”和“智慧城”的概念，路面上的所有车，都将自动分享全城的交通信息，并确定：哪些路正非常拥挤或者有交通事故。你正在前行的，将永远是最优路线。

And because it's actually into the concepts of "material networking" and "intellectual city," all cars on the road will automatically share traffic information across the city and determine which roads are very crowded or have traffic accidents. You are on your way, and you will always be the best route.

不过，最最让人惊叹的，还是第五点。

However, the most impressive point is the fifth point.

根据布里奇斯的设想：eSAVs也会有类似“合伙开车道”的专用群道（Platoon Lane）。在这些道路里，eSAVs将能够像“鱼群”一样，整齐划一地快速移动。车队在无线电号的连接下，可以同时加速、转向和制动，就像一个“同步鱼群”，所有的车，会在1/1000分之一秒内，重复领头车的动作。

According to Bridges, eSAVs also have special lanes (Platoon Lane) similar to the "partner-driving lanes." In these roads, eSAVs will be able to move fast and neatly like the "fishes." Under radio links, the motorcade can accelerate, turn and brake simultaneously, like a "synchronous fish" and all cars will repeat the lead car movement within 1/1000 seconds.

布里奇斯说：这种“车队”，在同一时间内，能够来回运载的客流量，是目前公交系统的7倍。

Bridges said that such “caravans” were seven times more capable of carrying passengers back and forth within the same time frame than the current bus system.

这不是痴心妄想。

It's not delusional.

2016年4月，欧洲的卡车车队挑战赛中，沃尔沃、戴姆勒等公司的车队，在近距离行驶了数百英里后，在鹿特丹会合。这种“鱼群式”车队，在高峰期增加每小时车道可容纳的车辆数、大大减少拥堵方面，有很大潜力，目前业界还在研究这种车队。

In April 2016, in Europe, the truck fleets of Volvo and Daimler joined up in Rotterdam after several hundred miles in close proximity. This “fish-like” fleet has great potential for increasing the number of vehicles that can be accommodated in the lanes per hour during peak periods and significantly reducing congestion, and is currently being studied by industry.

（五）

不过写到这里，我要来泼冷水了。

But here's the thing. I'm gonna throw cold water.

因为2019年2月，美国的一个公交创新项目死亡。这个创业公司，叫Chariot。

Because in February 2019, a public transport innovation project in the United States died. This start-up company, Chariot.

2015年，它刚冒出来时，我曾经在硅发布上写过它《Uber 已经过时? 看 Chariot 怎么颠覆公交系统》。Chariot之所以吸引我，是因为它允许我们每个人都可以自己定制公交路线。

In 2015, when it came out, I wrote on Silicon: > > > > ; see how Chariotott was allowed us to dictate to dictate < < > >.

然后，它让大家投票；接着，它会从数据库里选出投票率最高的路线，供大家进一步表决。当表决达到一定程度，比如100%，Chariot就会开通路线，并租来专用车辆进行公交服务的运营。

Then it lets people vote; then it selects from the database the most popular route for further voting. When the vote reaches a certain level, for example, 100%, Chariot opens the route and rents a dedicated vehicle to operate the bus service.

2016年，Chariot被福特以6500万美金收购。

In 2016, Chariot was bought by Ford for $65 million.

需要注意的是：Chariot的票价，要比Uber这种打车软件便宜很多，它针对的正是那种有固定上下班路线，但是收入不高的人群。

It is important to note that Chariot's fare is much cheaper than the Uber-type cabling software, which targets people with fixed access routes, but with low incomes.

但即便如此，福特也下定决心放弃。2019年2月，福特突然宣布：Chariot将彻底关闭，原因是：愿意共乘一辆车的人，实在太少了。

But even so, Ford was determined to give up. In February 2019, Ford suddenly announced that Chariot would be completely shut down because there were too few people willing to share a car.

Chariot的死亡，也侧面说明了：要让人们放弃“独自占用一辆车”的习惯，是非常难的一件事。这就提出了一个问题：到底需要有多强的激励，才能够把人们从——“单人独占一辆车”——的驾车习惯中撬出来呢？

The death of Chariot also illustrates that it is very difficult to get people to abandon the habit of “occupying a car alone.” This raises the question of how much incentive is needed to get people out of the driving habit of “taking a car alone”?

---

（六）

布里奇斯的答案是：免费。

The answer for Bridges is free.

也就是说：在交通高峰段，只要有人愿意与他人共乘，那么就可以在享受eSAVs酷炫功能的同时，不需要支付任何费用。

In other words, at the peak of the traffic, when someone is willing to co-operate with others, they can enjoy the cool functions of eSAVs without paying any fees.

为了进一步大家刺激乘坐，他还专门设计了一套激励机制，叫“红萝卜+大棒”。

To further stimulate travel, he has also designed a set of incentives called “Rorrow + Stick”.

需要说明的是：当无人车大规模普及时，大部分车都将是电动车，这是业界共识。而十年之内，电动无人车的部件如电池、电机、传感器和电子设备的成本，将大幅下降。

What needs to be explained is that, when unmanned vehicles become widely available, most of them will be electric vehicles, which is the consensus in industry. In a decade, the cost of components such as batteries, electric machines, sensors, and electronic equipment for electric unmanned vehicles will be significantly reduced.

根据一系列眼花缭乱的计算，布里奇斯得出的数据如下：

On the basis of a series of miscalculations, Bridges produced the following data:

到2027年：

By 2027:

• 2人型的eSAV-2s，运营成本将为18美分/每英里；
• 4人型的eSAV-4s，运营成本将为24美分/每英里。

而“红萝卜+大棒”激励机制，被设计为如下。我们先来讲“大棒”策略，它是指：在高峰期情况下，

And the carrot + stick incentive is designed as follows. Let's start with the stick strategy, which means that in peak times,

• 如果“一个人独自使用”eSAV，需要支付：1.4美分/每英里。
• 如果要“上高速”，则需要支付：5美分/每英里。

也就是说：如果一个人在高峰期独自一人使用eSAV并上了高速，那么他将要支付：

In other words, if a person uses eSAV alone and on a high highway during peak periods, he will pay:

1.4美分/英里+5美分/每英里+（18美分或24美分）/每英里。

1.4 cents/miles + 5 cents/miles + (18 cents or 24 cents)/miles.

这就是大棒策略。以降低大家单人独占一辆车并上高速的机率。

That's the big-ass strategy. That's to reduce the chances of people taking a single car and getting on a high-speed trip.

而如果，这个人在高峰期，选择了与他人共乘（通常情况下，是1-2个人），那么，他不仅可以免费坐，还可以进入到速度更快的“群队专用车道”。还记得吗？前面说过，这种车道在同一时间内，能实现的来回客流运载量是目前公交系统的7倍。

And if, at the peak, the person chooses to co-locate with others (usually one or two persons), he can not only sit free of charge, but also enter the faster “troop-only” driveway. Remember, as stated earlier, the number of incoming and outgoing passenger traffic that can be achieved during the same period of time is seven times greater than in the current bus system.

这就是“红罗卜”策略。

This is the Red Rob strategy.

布里奇斯相信：在这一方案的刺激下，将大大增大我们与人共乘eSAVs的想法。

Bridges believes that, inspired by this formula, our idea of sharing eSAVs will be greatly enhanced.

不过，所有的创新，本质上其实是一个经济问题。

However, all innovations are essentially an economic issue.

如果我们每个人都可以在高峰期免费乘坐这些超级无人车，这里产生的巨大成本，将由谁来承担呢？

Who will bear the huge cost if each and every one of us can travel in these super-manufactured vehicles free of charge during peak periods?

---

（七）

答案是：谁都不用出。但是政府必须和私企合作。并且布里奇斯认为：介入公交市场，将会是无人车私人企业一个非常关键性的竞争策略。

The answer is: no one has to come out. But the government has to work with the private sector. And Bridges believes that getting involved in the public transport market would be a very critical competitive strategy for private enterprises without vehicles.

下面，是一系列把我头脑搞得很大的数学题，请您也做好头脑风暴的准备。

Here's a series of math questions that made my mind so big that you're ready for the storm.

首先，按照美国公交协会的报告：

First, according to the American Bus Association report:

2013年，美国共投入了313亿美元来支持259亿英里的公交客运。但其中，消费者自己花钱买票，仅占到21%。也就是说：乘客其实只承担了乘坐公交总费用的1/5。其它的79%，主要都来自政府补贴（州和地方税）。

In 2013, the US invested $31.3 billion to support 25.9 billion miles of public transport. But consumers paid for their own tickets, only 21%.

如此计算的话：2013年，平均一个公交乘客，平均每一英里，政府给到这个乘客的补贴，是95美分。而布里奇斯指出：如果政府把这一补贴给到私人公司，那么将完美解决成本问题，并且，双方都不需要再增添费用。

In this calculation, an average of one bus passenger per mile in 2013, the government’s subsidy to this passenger is 95 cents. And Bridges says that if the government pays this subsidy to a private company, the cost will be solved perfectly, and neither side will need to add more.

具体计算方式如下：

The calculations are as follows:

前面提到过：

As mentioned earlier:

• eSAV-2s，运营成本是18美分/每英里
• eSAV-4s，运营成本是24美分/每英里

但是由于这些eSAV，实际上不可能全部都客满，所以大概可以估算出下面这些数据：

However, because of these eSAVs, it is not practically possible to fill them all, so the following data can probably be estimated:

• 每个乘客，平均乘坐eSAV-2s的成本是：9美分/每英里（18美分/2）；
• 每个乘客，平均乘坐eSAV-4s的成本是：8美分/每英里（24美分/3，因为不可能坐满，所以不是除以4）；

以及以此类推，每个乘客，平均乘坐eSAV-10s的每英里成本，应该更少。也就是说，基本可以假定为：每一乘客，乘坐eSAVs的运营成本是：9美分/每英里。

And, by this, the average cost per mile per passenger, eSAV-10s, should be even lower. That is, it can be assumed that the operating cost per passenger, eSAVs, is 9 cents per mile.

而前面说过，如果进入专供eSAVs使用的群道车道，同一时间内，“eSAVs车队”能运载的客流量，是目前公交系统的7倍。现在可以来计算了：

As was said earlier, if you enter a lot of lanes dedicated to eSAVs, the traffic that the eSAVs motorcade can carry at the same time is seven times that of the current bus system. It can now be calculated:

95美分-（9美分*7）=32美分

95 cents - (9 cents*7) = 32 cents

也就是说：如果政府交通部门把平摊到每一个人身上的95美分/每英里补贴，给到无人车私人公司，那么，哪怕是花掉63美分，去运送目前客流7倍的eSAVs免费乘坐，仍然剩有32美分，可以去提供其他服务。

In other words, if the Government transportation services pay 95 cents per mile per subsidy per person to private companies with no vehicles, even if 63 cents are spent on transporting the seven-fold current eSAVs free of charge, and 32 cents remain to provide other services.

---

（八）

根据上面的数据，现在，我们来看一下eSAVs将产生多大的威力。

According to the data above, now, let's see how powerful the eSAVs will be.

首先，美国将有多少人可以免费乘车？

First of all, how many people in the United States will be able to take a car free of charge?

2013年，美国共有1.054亿人在用车，而在市中心，用公交系统的人是367.3万。现在假设：如果政府补贴能允许给7倍于目前公交客流的人提供服务，那么就是：

In 2013, there were 105.4 million people using vehicles in the United States, while 3.673 million used the bus system in the centre of the city. It is assumed that if government subsidies allow services to be provided to seven times the current bus flow:

367.3万*7=2600万人。

3.63 million* = 26 million.

而这2600万人，需要多少eSAVs来提供服务呢？

And how many eSAVs do these 26 million people need to serve?

假设提供服务的全是eSAVs-4s，根据布里奇斯的计算：每个eSAVs-4，平均搭载2.8个乘客。同时高峰期，在同一时间内，eSAVs能达到的行程量，是目前公交系统行程量的三个来回，也就是六倍的行程。

Assuming that all services are provided by eSAVs-4s, according to Bridges: each eSAVs-4 carries an average of 2.8 passengers. At the same peak, at the same time, eSAVs are able to reach three trips, or six times the current bus system.

计算如下：

Calculated as follows:

2600万乘客/（6倍的车行程 * 每趟车里有2.8个乘客）=155万辆eSAVs。

26 million passengers/(six times the journey * 2.8 passengers per vehicle) = 1.55 million eSAVs.

这是一个大数字吗？

Is that a big number?

布里奇斯指出：从制造能力讲，2017年，美国共卖出约1720万辆的汽车和轻型卡车，他预测：再过十年，2027年，美国满足制造155万辆eSAVs，应该不是难题。

Bridges noted that in 2017, the United States sold about 17.2 million vehicles and light trucks in terms of manufacturing capacity, and he predicted that in another 10 years, in 2027, the United States would meet the challenge of manufacturing 1.55 million eSAVs.

那么，这155万辆eSAVs，究竟能够“移走”多少路面拥堵呢？

So, how many blocks can these 1.55 million eSAVs be “removed”?

刚才说过：高峰时段，2600万人，可以免费用eSAVs。而本来就有367.3万人是公交通勤者，也就是说：新产生的公交乘客，约有2230万人。

As we have just said, 26 million people can use eSAVs free of charge during peak hours, while 3,673,000 people are public transport workers, that is to say, some 22.3 million new bus passengers.

而按“每一辆车搭1.06人”计：如果不用eSAVs，这2230万新人本来会在路面上创造出2100万辆的车。但是用了eSAVs之后，155万辆的eSAVs，就可以把2100万辆车给灭了。

On the other hand, according to the figure of 1.06 people per car: 22.3 million newcomers would have created 21 million cars on the road without eSAVs. But after using eSAVs, 1.55 million eSAVs would have destroyed 21 million cars.

也就是说：这原来将产生的2100万辆车，没有了。

In other words, this would have generated 21 million vehicles, none.

但这不是减少的车辆总数，因为eSAVs自己，也产生了车辆数。所以，正确的计算方式应该如下：

However, this is not a reduction in the total number of vehicles, because eSAVs themselves also generate the number of vehicles. Therefore, the correct calculation should be as follows:

考虑到eSAVs在高峰期每小时可以来回跑三趟。也就是说：高峰每小时，其共产生了930万次的单次车程（6次*155万辆车=930万单次车程）

Taking into account that eSAVs can travel three times an hour during peak hours, that means that at peak hours, they produce 9.3 million single-car trips (6 *1.15 million vehicles = 9.3 million single-car trips)

这也相当于：这一小时内，路面有930万辆的eSAVs在跑。所以改用了eSAVs后，正确的路面跑的车辆总数应该是：

This also means that there are 9.3 million eSAVs running on the road within an hour. So, after using eSAVs, the correct number of vehicles running on the road should be:

2100万辆 – 930 万辆=1170 万辆?

21 million & #8211; 9.3 million = 11.7 million?

而原本1.0540亿开车的人，按平均每辆车1.06个人计，路上原来会有9940万辆车。也就是说：

The original 1054 million drivers, in terms of an average of 10.6 persons per vehicle, would have been 9.4 million vehicles on the road.

高峰时期，用155万辆的eSAVs，可以免费搭载2600万的通勤者，并让整体路上跑的车辆总数减少12%（1170万辆车/9940万辆车=12%）。

At the peak of the period, 1.55 million eSAVs were used to transport 26 million commuters free of charge and to reduce the total number of vehicles on the road by 12 per cent (11.7 million vehicles and 96.4 million vehicles = 12 per cent).

并且这一切，不花一分钱。

And all this, it doesn't cost a penny.

只需要在高峰期，给那些原本就有9美分/每英里公交补贴的2600万美国人，免费使用超级无人公交车eSAVs。

At the peak, only 26 million Americans who would otherwise have received a 9 cent/mile bus subsidy would be required to use the super-unmanned bus eSAVs free of charge.

---

（九）

现在，全书最最宝贵的内容来了。

Now, here comes the most valuable part of the book.

按照布里奇斯设计的2027年模式，到了2027年，美国在交通高峰时间段，路上跑的车型比例会是如下：

According to the 2027 model designed by Bridges, by 2027 the United States will have the following proportion of vehicles running on the road during peak traffic times:

……

本文剩余内容的主要摘要如下：

1，在2027年模式中，交通高峰时间段，传统私家汽油车、电动无人车以及免费的eSAVs，在路上跑的车型比例分别是？
2，令人惊讶，尽管电动无人车所占的车型比例不高，但它所占的总车程量却相当高。那么在2027年模式中，传统私家汽油车、电动无人车以及免费的eSAVs，各自所占的通勤者比例又分别是多少？（这里最让人惊讶的是eSAVs的能量之大）
3，“2027”年其实只是一个象征性数字，它非常有可能会因为电动车成本下降不如预期快、无人车移动服务市场渗透率不如预期快等原因而有所延迟。但布里奇斯的“2027年模式”，不仅将解决致命的拥堵问题，还将产生巨大的投资回报。这个投资回报是指：每年多少万亿美金的财富创造？

In the 2027 model, the proportion of traditional private gasoline cars, electric unmanned vehicles, and free eSAVs running on the road is
2, which is surprising, although the proportion of electric unmanned vehicles is not high, the total traffic is quite high. In the 2027 model, the share of traditional private gasoline cars, electric unmanned vehicles and free eSAVs will be different. The return on investment is: how many trillion dollars of wealth are created each year?

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说明：因为各种各样的原因，我在微信公号写的东西和我在知识星球写的不太一样，关心美国创投圈的专业读者，请移步到我的知识星球。如下扫码登录（老星球用户续费请见底下那个二维码）

Note: For a variety of reasons, what I wrote on the microsatellite is different from what I wrote on the knowledge planet, interested in professional readers of American creative circles, please move to my knowledge planet.

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先来回答一下几位朋友针对上一篇文章（详见《个人VC崛起：一个人就管理6.2亿美金》）的提问。

A few friends responded to the previous article (for details, see : a person managing 620 million US$).

第一个疑问是：“我猜这些独立风险资本家的资金来源就是华尔街”；第二个是：“全都自己干，怎么做DD呢，这样会不会失败率更高？”

The first question is: “I guess the source of funding for these independent venture capitalists is Wall Street”; the second is: “All do it on their own, how do DDs do it, and will the failure rate be higher?”

如下：

As follows:

1，这些资金来源不是华尔街，而是来自于传统VC的LP们。所以，这是风险投资行业内部自身发生的变化，其核心原因是：LP想要追逐更好的投资回报。

1 These sources of funding are not Wall Street, but are from traditional VC LPs. So, this is a change within the venture capital industry itself, and the central reason is that the LP wants better returns on investment.

而吸引LP的是：独立风险投资家的业绩记录（我在文章中列举过这些独立风险投资家在过去10多年以个人投资者名义投资的一系列公司）。

Instead, LP is attracted by the performance record of independent venture capitalists (a series of companies that have been invested by these independent venture investors in the name of individual investors for more than a decade or so).

与此同时，LP押注：创始人更愿意从人脉广泛的个人那里拿钱（真正创过业、签过投资协议的创业者，感同身受一下，你是更想从个人那里拿钱，还是从机构那里拿钱？）

At the same time, the LP points out that the founders prefer to take money from a wide range of individuals.

---

2，先纠正一下：投资更注重的不是失败率，而是成功投资案例的收益倍数。

2 To be corrected first, investment is not focused on failure rates, but rather on multiple returns from successful investment cases.

同时，个人VC这个人群实际上很小，不是所有人都有能力作为一个“Solo Capitalist”从LP那里拿到钱的。风险投资之所以能够成为一种商业模式，其顶层首先是：认知差。我在文章中列举的Elad Gil，他首先是一位思想家。

At the same time, the individual VC is actually very small, and not everyone has the ability to get money from the LP as a solo Capitalist. The top of the venture is: poor awareness. Elad Gil, which I have listed in my post, is first and foremost a thinker.

但有一点是对的，那就是：作为对冲基金冲击西海岸硅谷式风险投资模式的一个结果，美国一、二级市场的融合，正在进一步下沉。

But one thing is right: as a result of the impact of hedge funds on the Silicon Valley-style investment model on the west coast, the convergence of the first and second-tier markets in the United States is sinking further.

具体表现为：今年开始，硅谷的一些创业者，在寻找早期风险投资时，不再去沙丘路找VC，而是反过来，去东海岸寻求华尔街金融机构的帮忙。

This is reflected in the fact that starting this year, some entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, in search of early risk investments, stopped looking for VC on Sandhill Road and, in turn, went to the East Coast for help from Wall Street financial institutions.

这些金融机构包括：像高盛、摩根士丹利、摩根大通这样的大投资银行，也包括像William Blair这样的一些规模较小的投资银行。

These include large investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Morgan Chase, as well as smaller investment banks such as William Blair.

这是很奇怪的，因为在以前，一般创业公司只会在两种情况下去寻求投资银行的帮助，一种是：当公司要上市的时候；第二种是：当公司要把自己卖掉的时候，也就是委托投资银行寻找买家。

This is strange because, in the past, the average start-up company had to seek the help of an investment bank only in two cases: when the company was to be listed; and when the company was to sell itself, when the investment bank was to look for a buyer.

而造成这种变化背后的核心原因就是：

The core causes behind this change are:

……

本文剩余内容需要大家到我的知识星球阅读，剩余内容包括以下内容：

The remaining elements of this paper, which need to be read on my knowledge planet, include the following:

1，为什么会发生这种变化？

1 Why is this change taking place?

2，关于这种交易的一般交易方式。

2 The general mode of dealing with such transactions.

3，关于驱动力：创业公司为什么要这样做？投资银行又为什么要这样做？

Three, on drivers: why would an entrepreneur do that? Why would an investment bank do that?

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